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NOTES
it is probably unnecessary to attempt that drastic a measure. When a
government attempts to set itself up as a censor of thought, it teeters
on the brink of tyranny.
But it is not impossible to prevent the terrible effects of intolerance.
The true solution is legislation to curb abuses by individuals and or-
ganizations which deprive others of the freedoms they demand for
themselves, coupled with a sincere and determined effort to eradicate
through education the ignorance that engenders bigotry. Only by a
clear understanding and appreciation of God-given rightsand equality
and fundamental freedoms can the American nation resolve the prob-
lems it faces. True Brotherhood of Man depends upon a recognition
of the Fatherhood of God. With our own house in order, we can ac-
cept our duties of leadership in democratic action in the world.
B. M. Apker
LABoR LAw-COMMENT ON THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT, TITLE III.-
A fair and just discussion of the Taft-Hartley Act 1 is impossible with-
out a fair determination of the purpose for which it was enacted. The
Act itself explains that its purpose is to protect by legal procedures the
rights of employees, employers, and the public concerning labor dis-
putes affecting commerce. But to understand fully the basic purpose
for this or another law applicable to labor-management relations, we
must examine the justification for government activity in the economic
sphere.
The purpose of government is to guarantee the common happiness.
All agree that a certain amount of material goods are absolutely neces-
sary to the happiness of men. It is the primary purpose of economic
activity to produce and distribute these material goods. If the eco-
nomic forces acted so as to guarantee that amount of material goods
requisite to the happiness of all individuals within their sphere, there
would be no justification for governmental regulation of economic ac-
tivity, provided, of course, that all of the other rights of the individual
were also guaranteed.
Our nation has embraced the capitalistic system. Therefore, it is
the duty of this economic system to guarantee to all individuals within
its sphere the production and distribution of material goods relating to
their happiness. If the economic system does not guarantee this produc-
tion and distribution, it is the duty of the government, then, to take
the necessary steps in regulating capitalism so that happiness of all
will result.
1 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 STAT. 120.
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It is beyond denial that "free"--that is, laissez-faire--capitalism
failed to exercise the before-delineated function of the economic system.
During the period of rampant industrial expansion of the late Nine-
teenth and early Twentieth centuries, large segments of the propertyless
working classes and the farmers were reduced to economic slavery. The
unregulated capitalistic system, which, by its very nature, gives an ad-
vantage to the employer 2 had demonstrated its incapacity to serve the
wants of human beings. Therefore, since this natural advantage could
best be offset by workingmen combined together, for the purpose of
presenting their collective grievances, labor unions came into existence.
But these, without governmental protection, were placed at a great dis-
advantage themselves because their activities were looked upon with dis-
favor by all employers, most courts, and some legislators. Therefore,
since the capitalistic system had shown its inability to function properly
without being regulated, the government at last stepped in between labor
and management and secured to each the right of collective bargaining
which is the very life blood of trade unionism.
Legislation which is generally regarded as "favorable to labor" culmi-
nated in the National Labor Relations Act, passed in 1935.3 The policy
of this Act-that of encouraging amicable settlements of labor disputes
by collective bargaining--is the guiding principle of all governmental
interference with labor-management relations.
As long as both parties come to the bargain table in good faith,
neither party may be forced to concede any of its positions. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has the power to determine-upon the
complaint of either of the parties-whether or not an unfair labor prac-
tice is being perpetrated by the other party. The Board has never tried
to decide summarily the primary incidents of labor relations. Statutory
enactments cannot solve the basic problems of labor and management;
to pretend to do so would be to destroy the basis of our free enterprise
svstem. These basic issues must be left to the disputants themselves.
The bargaining power of both parties must be equal.
Nevertheless, there are those who reached the conclusion that the
scales had swung far in favor of the unions. A series of particularly
spectacular strikes, coming upon the heels of the war, stirred up a wave
of emotionalism against the unions. The proponents of change in th
Wagner Act wrote the Taft-Hartley Act, which is the subject of discus
sion here.
2 ADAm SMITH, WYALTH or NATIoNs Chapter 4, enunciates the fact of em-
ployer or master supremacy by the very nature of a capitalistic economy. Whether
this is to be considered an inherent weakness in the capitalistic system depends
upon the economic philosophy of the individual, but the fact of the advantage can
hardly be questioned.
3 49 STAT. 449.
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The Taft-Hartley Act has been divided into five titles. Title I4
and Title II5 have been discussed in previous issues of the NoTRE
DAME LAWYER. We shall discuss Title III.
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act reiterates the already accepted
fact that unions are liable in court actions for violations of any con-
tracts into which they may enter. Any district court of the United States
may now, however, assume jurisdiction of a case involving a labor dis-
pute without the ordinary requisites concerning the amount involved or
diversity of citizenship. The requirement of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 6
that the liability of labor unions for acts of its agents could only be
imputed to the union when there was authorization or ratification by
the union has been changed by the Taft-Hartley Act. Now the author-
ization or ratification is not to be controlling. Mr. Taft has indicated
that this provision was included in the Act to render unions liable for
wildcat strikes which the unions have neither ordered nor approved. It
is, of course, the prerogative of the National Labor Relations Board, in
each particular case, to determine whether or not a person acted in the
particular circumstances as an agent of the union. This provision, how-
ever, will undoubtedly render the agency relationship more readily
attachable to the labor union and thus reduce their financial power ac-
cording to the damages assessed against them for an act they did not
direct or approve. Thus we see that more responsibility for labor union
members' actions has been placed on the union while many provisions
of the Act lessen the control that a union may exercise of its members.
Section 302 of the Act makes any payment of part of the worker's
paycheck by an employer to a labor union a crime. This provision is
aimed at the "check-off" of union dues, initiation fees and assessments,
a system whereby union financial obligations are paid directly from
the employer to the labor union. This system may be reinstated if
the employee makes a written assignment signifying that he so desires
the dues to be taken out of his paycheck and paid directly to the
union.
At present writing, many unions are exerting great effort to have all
union members make this assignment so that their dues may continue
to be checked off. The purported purpose of this provision was to pre-
vent unwilling members from being forced to pay dues against their
will. It cannot be doubted, however, that all who reap the benefits of
labor union activity should share in the burden of its expense, particu-
larly those who are members. If a member should pay dues, it seems in-
consequential how he does so. Forcing unions to create added facili-
4 Note, 23 NoTRE DA~m LAWYER 238 (1948).
5 Note, 23 No=R DAm: LAwYER 349 (1948).
6 47 STAT. 106 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 71 (1934).
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ties for collecting their dues appears, then, to be merely another method
of reducing labor union efficiency.
Section 302 (c) (5) also provides that life, health or accident insur-
ance, or other like pension funds may be created and that the employer
may contribute directly to the trust fund provided that the administra-
tion of the fund complies with the procedure outlined in this section
of the Act.
This section will take added importance in the view of the National
Labor Relations Board decision in the Inland Steel case in which the
Board decided by a four to one decision that pension plans come within
the scope of the Taft-Hartley Act which requires both employers and
unions to bargain collectively, "with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment." 7 This decision met, of course,
with violent disapproval by reactionary laissez faire capitalists who
immediately claimed it to be another trend toward socialism in Ameri-
can economy. The government of the United States has determined,
however, that such old age or emergency security is a necessary requi-
site to an individual's material happiness. For management and labor
without government intervention to provide this requisite material bene-
fit themselves is rather a retention of the free enterprise economic sys-
tem than a trend toward socialism as claimed. Since it is the role of
the economic system to produce and distribute material wealth, these
incidents of material security seem to be necessarily within the role of
economic activity.
Section 303 of the Act outlaws many secondary boycotts on the part
of labor unions and gives to the injured party a right to an action
for damages. By virtue of this provision, unions may not engage in
strikes or partial work stoppages which have as their objects certain
benefits which will indirectly accrue to the unions. Unions may not force
other workers or working employers to unionize; they may not force
others to discontinue doing business with a third party; they may not
force another employer to bargain with a union not certified according
to the Taft-Hartley Act; 8 nor may a labor union force an assignment
of work by an employer to a particular union or craft.
This section of the Act specifically declares the above secondary
boycotts unlawful and gives a right of damages to the party injured
by such a boycott. It is to be distinguished from section 8(b) (4) of
the Act which makes the same secondary boycotts unfair labor prac-
tices, for which the National Labor Relations Board may secure preven-
tative injunctions. An injunction has been issued, however, at the
7 Sec. 8 (b) (6) (d).
8 Title I of the Labor Managements Relations Act, 1947, sets out union cer-
tification procedure.
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instance of the injured partr under section 303, the court determining
that the action at law for damages was inadequate and that the pros-
pective damages because of the boycott would be irreparable. This
court also upheld the constitutionality of this provision of the Act.9
This was the first action grounded on section 303 to be presented to a
federal court. A subsequent case also upheld the constitutionality of
this section outlawing certain secondary boycotts by enjoining a labor
union from the picketing of a third party who was doing business with
the labor union's disputant.' 0
By outlawing such secondary boycotts, the Taft-Hartley Act has
taken tremendous influence from the labor unions in jurisdictions in
which courts had recognized the boycott as a legitimate method of
enforcing labor's just demands. Unions now are limited greatly in ex-
erting collective pressure on all those members of management who are
doing business with an individual with whom the union is disputing.
To say that these other businesses dealing with an unfair employer
can be of no assistance to the union by refusing to deal with the unfair
employer is childish naivete. Secondary boycotts have been considered
unlawful, though, prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, because
courts and legislatures have determined that a disinterested third party
should be allowed to carry on his business unmolested by outside labor
disputes. It is the theory of these courts that concerted action to force
a third party to take a particular course of action, the secondary boy-
cott, is not a justifiable means of obtaining eventual economic benefits.
These courts do not forbid, of course, the use of direct ostracism of an
unfair employer, commonly known as the primary boycott. It is the
exertion of force upon a third party coercing him to take a particular
course of action against another that is considered objectionable. How-
ever, if the labor union is a fully collective society for the benefit of all
9 Gomez v. United Office and Professional Workers of America, C. I. 0.,
Local 16, et al., 73 F. Supp. 679 (D. C. D. C. 1947). In this case the union had
peacefully picketed a Washington, D. C. dance studio to bolster its fight against
a New York studio of the same name. The restraining order was issued when it
appeared that the amount of the studio's loss of trade resulting from the boycott
would be difficult to prove and also that the studio would be injured irreparably.
1,0 Dixie Motor Coach Corporation v. Amalgamated Association of Street,
Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, et al., 74 F. Supp. 952
(W. D. Ark. 1947). Here the union had called a strike against the Southern Bus
Lines, Inc., demanding changes in wages and working conditions. Southern Bus
Lines continued to operate their busses while their employees were on strike. In
operating their busses, the Southern Bus Lines used the terminal of the plaintiff,
Dixie Motor Coach Corporation. The union threatened to picket the plaintiff
if he continued to allow the Southern Bus Company to operate their busses from
the Dixie Motor Coach Corporation terminal. The plaintiff obtained a permanent
injunction against the union forbidding the union to picket the plaintiff's term-
inal since the picketing was for the purpose of forcing one person, the plaintiff,
to discontinue doing business with a third party, the Southern Bus Company.
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employees, it is only reasonable to expect that each member of the so-
ciety will desire to aid his brethren in any feasible manner. It is the role
of the courts and legislatures, however, to limit within reasonable bounds
those means by which unions effect their mutual benefit. Undoubtedly
the freedom of speech, press and assemblage has been curtailed by the
outlawing of the secondary boycott. Whether it has been abridged un-
reasonably; whether the disinterested third party should be insulated
from a particular phase of labor-management relations which have had
a forceful bearing on labor union effectiveness in the past, must be de-
termined not from a microscopic viewpoint of the particular situation.
Rather the legality of boycotts should be considered in reference to the
amount of bargaining power a labor union must have to guarantee equal-
ity at a collective bargaining table with management. The possibility
of ostracism of the bargaining employer by other employers .would have
a direct bearing on the willingness of said employer to reach an agree-
ment with the labor union. Whether the boycott prerogative is neces-
sary to equalize the bargaining power of labor and management is the
question.
The outlawing of labor union jurisdictional disputes appears to be a
valid restriction on the scope of union activity. These are problems
within the collective employee society itself, the solution of which should
not be allowed to interfere with the production or distribution of goods.
The just distribution of material goods in relation to the employer is in
no manner enhanced by allowing internal labor union problems to dis-
rupt the production of those goods.
However, the broad prohibition which the Taft-Hartley Act places
on secondary boycotts appears to be a definite curtailment of possibly
necessary incidents of labor union effectiveness.
Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act amended section 313 of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act," making it unlawful for any labor or-
ganization or corporation to make an expenditure in connection with any
election at which candidates for a federal office are to be selected or
voted for. The penal sanctions of this section extend also to an officer
of a labor organization or corporation who consents to such an expendi-
ture by the organization of which he is an officer. The definite purpose
of this provision was to prevent labor unions from expressing their
views on federal politics by speeches or through publications supported
by union funds. The Political Action Committee of the C. I. 0. would
have been forced to cease operations unless it could have mustered ex-
pense funds from sources outside the union.
This provision of the Act was declared unconstitutional on March
15, 1948, in the District Court of the United States for the District of
11 43 STAT. 1074 (1925), 2 U. S. C. § 251 (1934).
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Columbia.' 2 District Judge Ben Moore held that the portion of the
Act forbidding labor unions to sustain expenses in expressing their po-
litical views was an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, and freedom of assemblage.
In this case, the government pressed its criminal charges against the
C. I. 0. and Philip Murray on the basis of section 304 of the Taft-
Hartley Act. Mr. Murray, obviously in defiance of this provision, had
written an editorial in the C. I. 0. News, a publication sustained by
labor union funds, expressing union views concerning an impending
federal congressional election. The government conceded that the
Taft-Harfley provision abridged rights of individuals as guaranteed by
the First Amendment, but contended that Congress had the power to
abridge these rights because of its interest and control of elections and
therefore Congress was acting within its constitutional power in enact-
ing section 304. Judge Moore brushed this contention aside by stating
that the constitutional rights of free speech and a free press in elections
could only be abridged when a grave abuse calculated to create serious
public danger existed or was impending. No such situation existed
merely because labor unions were expressing their political views through
labor union publications. In fact, the public has an important right
to hear both sides of a political issue through the presses; a right which
the Taft-Hartley Act sought to abridge. Judge Moore explained that
the majority of any collective group expresses the ideas of the group,
and the fact that a certain minority might hold conflicting views was
no sound basis to abuse the constitutional guarantee of free speech, a
free press, and the freedom of assemblage. Thus this section of the
Taft-Hartley Act, which would have seriously impaired the efficiency
of labor unions in attracting public audience for their views, seems to
be no longer the law of the land.
Section 305 makes strikes by government employees unlawful and
provides penalties of loss of employment and loss of civil service status
by the employee so striking. There seems to be no justifiable objection
to such a provision under present circumstances. Employment by the
government is a privilege for which the government should have the
right to designate reasonable conditions of acceptance. The government
occupies a different position as employer than does management gener-
ally. The distinction between their relative positions is the important
differentiating feature. The guarantee of employee rights against man-
agement lies in part in the strike. Both the employee and the public
can protect their rights against the state by voting in a new govern-
ment. No such guarantee, obviously, exists for the employee of private
management.
12 United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 16 L. W. 2452
(D. C. D. C. 1948).
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It seems reasonable, then, for the government to demand that it be
allowed to carry on its delegated sovereign functions devoid of the pos-
sibility of a paralyzing strike. This provision of the Act, of course,
does not prevent any individual employee acting as an individual to
quit his job at his pleasure and seek his material gain in that part of
the economic sphere where he is guaranteed the right to strike, or
rather, where he should be guaranteed the right to strike. An over-
whelming majority of laborers make their livings from private enter-
prise, and for this reason their right to strike must be protected. For
them no alternative exists. This alternative seems conclusive of the
reasonableness of section 305.
Since the publication in the NoTmE DA LAwYER of comments on
Title I and II of the Taft-Hartley Act, labor-management relations
have raised many interesting questions pertaining to those sections of
the Act. In this comment we will endeavor to discuss a few of the re-
cent National Labor Relations Board rulings and court decisions applic-
able thereto.
By a two-to-one decision, a statutory three judge court sitting in the
District of Columbia upheld the validity of the filing of the non-com-
munist affidavit as a requirement for Board benefits. In the case 1 8
presented to the court, the Maritime Union, among other plaintiffs,
sought to enjoin the enforcement of the affidavit requirement provision
of the Labor Management Relations Act which would deny the union
recognition by the Board. All the judges upheld the validity of the
financial statement requirement, but a serious question arose concerning
the constitutionality of the requirement of filing a non-communist affi-
davit as an abridgment of the First Amendment guarantee of the free-
dom of speech. Both the majority and the dissent agreed that the
filing of a non-communist affidavit could be, in the broad requirement of
section 9 (h) of the Taft-Hartley Act, an abridgment of the First
Amendment. Both agreed that conditions giving rise to a justifiable
abridgment of free speech must be of such a nature that to speak or to
refrain from speaking would present a menace to the welfare of the
nation.
Without referring to the lengthy opinion of the majority, fraught
with dicta, nor to the juridical analysis of the problem expressed by the
dissent, it seems fair to state that the clash of views between the ma-
jority and the dissent arose over a question of the type of evidence which
the court required to make a constitutional determination.
The majority took the view that the court could take judicial notice
of the "facts of current history" along with the congressional determina-
1:3 National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, 16 L. W. 2502 (D. C.
D. C. 1948).
NOTFS
tion that communist activity in labor unions was insidious to the gener-
al welfare, and with no evidence offered to the court on that subject
whatsoever, decide whether an abridgment of free speech by Congress
was justifiable. The dissent did not agree on this point, but felt that
a determination of the danger of communistic union activity to the gen-
eral welfare demanded that the court so determining should be presented
with evidence from which a conclusion could be made. The word of
Congress was not to be accepted on this point. The dissent felt that,
were evidence not required, Congress would be at liberty, by merely
making an affirmation of a fact, to flout constitutional rights with im-
punity. It was the duty of the court, it was said, to make its own sepa-
rate, independent determination of fact if it were to speak as an inde-
pendent court. Thus, the dissent argued, since no evidence was offered
as to the relative danger of communism to the general welfare, the guar-
antee of the First Amendment must stand.
In the highly publicized United Mine Workers coal strike the stun-
ning power of the Taft-Hartley Act completely to subjugate unions is
conclusively demonstrated. When a pension plan agreement was not
carried out by the coal operators, union leader John L. Lewis informed
his union members that the contraqt had been violated and that the
miners were free to work or not as they pleased. A general mining
stoppage immediately occurred. Acting under the provisions of the Taft-
Hartley Act, most probably inserted in the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act for this exact situation, the President appointed a board to
investigate the stoppage. The board was to determine whether the in-
activity would be inimical to the general national welfare.
Acting on the board's report, the government obtained a restraining
order prohibiting the strike. The stoppage continued; Mr. Lewis claimed
that he had called no strike and explained that miners do not work un-
der broken contracts. Later a pension agreement was reached between
the operators and Lewis. However Judge Goldsborough, of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, found that the re-
straining order had been violated in that the union was guilty of con-
tinuing a strike after the issuance of the prohibition. 14 The contention
of Lewis that he had called no strike was by-passed when the Judge
ruled that any union functioning as a union must be held responsible
for mass actions of its members. The Judge declared that Lewis' tele-
grams to the union locals contained code messages indicating that a
strike was called. The heavy penalties, along with an eighty day Taft-
Hartley statutory injunction 15 influenced Lewis to urge his miners
14 United States v. International Union, United Mine Workers of America,
16 L. W. 2515 (D. C. D. C. 1948).
15 The eighty-day injunction is authorized under the National Emergency
section of the Taft-Hartley Act, Sec. 206-210.
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back to work again. The right to engage in a strategic strike was thus
completely abridged as far as the United Mine Workers were concerned.
The provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act wound the miners in a web of
futility.
Judge Goldsborough, in issuing the statutory injunction, upheld the
constitutionality of the applicable provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The court pointed out that an injunction to prevent a strike has never
been held to be a deprivation of the liberty of speech nor does it con-
stitute involuntary servitude. Presumably, indicated the judge, an
inhabitant of an exclusively mining town can choose to work, starve,
or move himself and his family to a new locality.
Undoubtedly a peaceful method of preventing national economic
emergencies which result from basic industrial strikes must be found.
However, to ignore completely the rights of labor in benefiting the pub-
lic is hardly just. It has been suggested that this problem might be
solved by declaring these basic industries public utilities. Some such
governmental action appears inevitable if collective bargaining in basic
industries proves futile.
Numerous other incidents of the use of the injunction have occurred
recently by virtue of the Taft-Hartley Act, preventing labor union ac-
tivity when the unions have attempted to enforce their demands.10
The Act entangles the unions in injunctions, court costs, attorney fees,
and new National Labor Relations Board requirements. These demands
reduce severely the efficiency of labor unions in carrying out their pur-
pose of protecting labor. The Taft-Hartley Act has been congratulated
recently by many devotees of big business because of its success in
quieting the labor seas, particularly in its rapid termination of the coal
strike. Usually these settlements have been brought about by labor
unions withdrawing their demands in the face of the tremendous legal
power of the Taft-Hartley Act. To continue to press their demands
only to reach eventual failure in the courts causes many unions to capit-
ulate immediately. For this quiescence the Taft-Hartley Act has been
complimented as being the instrumentality of settling the disputes. We
would indicate that there exists an infinite difference in the meaning of
the word settle and the word suppress.
Returning now to our original premise, we see that the primary pur-
pose of an economic system is the production and distribution of
wealth. Wealth, however, is not an end, but a means to the end of
the happiness of all. Wealth is not held absolutely, but as a steward-
16 United States News and World Reports, April 16, 1948.
NOTES ,
ship for Him Who created the wealth. 17 We noted that before the rise
of- strong labor unions, this wealth was far from properly distributed.
No valid argument can exist that the pro-labor legislation of the
thirties did not assist in a more just distribution of this wealth. We
are of the opinion that whatever ills, if any, labor unions have brought
to this country, one of them was not the change they brought about in
the distribution of material goods.
Labor's position under this social legislation bettered its economic
position and took from capital much of the unequal strength with which
it had previously coerced labor. Management's position under the
Wagner Act based on its natural advantage, did not deteriotate as to
deprive it of its just share of the fruits of production. If there were ills
in the labor-management relation, they did not exist in the field of dis-
tribution.
But the Taft-Hartley Act, which was enacted for the avowed pur-
pose of disrupting the bargaining power balance then existent, tends to
return management's supremacy at the bargaining table. It so ham-
strings labor's right to strike, to control its labor union members and
to effect efficiently its role as a guarantee of individual rights that the
guarantee no longer exists. As was stated in previous comments on the
Act in the Noma DAME LAwYER, all provisions of the Act, taken to-
gether, decrease union efficiency.
We see, particularly, that Title III is constructed in this same man-
ner. Each section removes power from labor unions or burdens them
in efficient operation. This cannot but reduce their bargaining power
at labor-management discussions. The correction of labor union ills
did not require the reduction of union ability to guarantee labor's
rights. The return to the natural unbalance with the employer in the
position of former advantage cannot help but be inferred from an an-
alysis of the Taft-Hartley Act. Those licenses of laissez-faire capital-
ism allowed to the employer are once again returned in the guise of the
protection of employer rights.
To descend to particulars is to quibble over terms. Labor attacks
these capitalistic incidents as licenses, management claims them as
rights. But the over-all effect as to the production and just distri-
bution of wealth guaranteed under the Wagner Act, threatens to be de-
stroyed with the return of employer supremacy under the Taft-Hartley
17 PoPE LEo XfII, ON THE CoND'nro or LABoR.
18 In subsequent issues, the NoTRs DA=E LAwYER intends to review the
Taft-Harfley Act further.
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Act. If labor unions possess ills, their bargaining power for justice
must not be taken from them to cure these ills lest we revert to the eco-
nomic slavery of the past.
To pretend to suggest the solution to the labor-management prob-
lem would be presumptuous indeed. Amicable and just adjustment of
differences by both labor and management is the only real solution to
the problem. Be this solution but an empty platitude, it is at least an
ideal for which both groups, labor and management, should strive.
Thomas F. Broden
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - POST-CONVICTION HEARINGS - THE
ILLINOIS SITUATION.-Illinois criminal procedure in the matter of post-
conviction hearings has recently been labeled by the Supreme Court of
the United States as a "procedural labyrinth made up entirely of blind
alleys." 1 Composing the labyrinth are the so-called alleys of "writ
of error," "habeas corpus" and the "statutory motion in the nature of
the common law writ of error coram nobis." These are the Illinois
state remedies available when an accused has supposedly been convicted
by a state court in deprivation of a right guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. It is the charge of the United States Supreme Court, however,
that the remedies are available in theory only. Grounding the charge
is the court docket record for the terms 1944, 1945 and 1946 which re-
veals the disproportionate number of petitions for certiorari to review
Illinois' refusals to grant relief, and frequently to grant even a hearing.
2
So that this procedural difficulty may be understood, it is well to ex-
amine the factual situation which prompted the Supreme Court's ad-
monition. In 1925, petitioner, Tony Marino, was arraigned in open
court on charge of murder. At the time he was eighteen years old,
had been in this country only two years, and did not understand the
English language. He was advised of the meaning of the plea of guilty
through interpreters, one of whom was the arresting officer. The com-
mon law record recited that petitioner signed a statement waiving jury
trial and pleading guilty. The waiver was not in fact signed by him
1 Mr. Justice Rutledge concurring in Marino v. Ragen, .... U. S ..... , 68 S. Ct.
240, 92 L. Ed. 203 (1947).
2 "During the last three terms we have been flooded with petitions from Illi-
nois alleging deprivation of due process and other constitutional rights. Thus in
the 1944 term out of a total of 339 petitions filed in forma pauperis, almost all
by prisoners, 141 came from Illinois; in the 1945 term 175 of 393 were from Illi-
nois; and in the 1946 term, 322 out of 528 came from that state." Mr. Justice
Rutledge concurring in Marino v. Ragen, .... U. S....., 68 S. Ct. 240, 242 (1947).
